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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

UP GUANTANAMO WITHOUT A PADDLE: WAVES OF AFGHAN
DETAINEES DROWN IN AMERICA’S GREAT HABEAS LOOPHOLE

A sleeping giant, which United States courts have not seen since World
War II, has again reared its ugly head, only to find that societal views on
national composition and sovereign identity have drastically changed, while
constitutional and international law have eerily stayed the same. Rarely does a
Supreme Court opinion with such expansive legal implications lay dormant for
more than 50 years without being revisited. But, such is the case with the
territorial limitation on the writ of habeas corpus established by Johnson v.
Eisentrager.1 During the first half of 2002, a new battle regarding this pivotal
issue was waged in the federal District Court for the District of Columbia. In
Rasul v. Bush,2 this court held that suspected terrorists detained at the U.S.
Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (Guantanamo), could not petition
federal courts for a writ of habeas corpus because Guantanamo was outside the
sovereign territory of the United States.
The question that will undoubtedly face the Supreme Court is whether
Eisentrager’s bright-line standard of “sovereignty” is still appropriate. Has the
meaning of sovereignty in the context of a world stage changed? Do the
connotations implicit in sovereignty remain, such that the idea is effective in
drawing definitive lines? Are the constitutional factors and international
concerns that guided the Eisentrager Court still present? Does the increasing
premium placed on human rights alter American views on fairness and justice,
especially in dealing with aliens considered enemies of the United States?
These are complex questions, and a realistic outlook of the United States’
presence in Guantanamo could and should lead the Supreme Court to overrule
or modify one of its most impenetrable opinions.
Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, President Bush
ordered the Armed Forces of the United States to “use all necessary and
1. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
2. 215 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2002). See also Coalition of Clergy v. Bush, 189 F. Supp.
2d 1036 (C.D.Cal. 2002), vacated by Coalition of Clergy v. Bush, 310 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2002)
(The federal District Court in California in Coalition dismissed a petition for habeas corpus on
roughly the same grounds as the Rasul court. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal on
standing grounds, while vacating the part of the opinion having to do with Eisentrager.); John C.
Eastman, Wrong Claim, Wrong Party, Wrong Court: Assessing the Petition Brought by a
Coalition of Clergy, Lawyers, & Professors on Behalf of Detainees Held by the U.S. Military in
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, The Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy Studies, at
http://www.fed-soc.org/Publications/Terrorism/petition.PDF (Jan. 15, 2003).
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appropriate force” against those responsible.3 American forces were sent to
Afghanistan, in search of members of the “Al Qaeda Terrorist Network.” The
United States captured suspected individuals and subsequently transported
them to the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo for detention.4
Rasul v. Bush is actually two cases combined, brought on behalf of almost
20 detainees in Gauntanamo.5 While one group (Rasul) petitioned for a writ of
habeas corpus and asked for release, along with counsel, and a cease of all
interrogations, the other group (Odah) only sought the right to meet with
family, be informed of the charges, and to consult with counsel.6 Because of
the obvious similarities in the two actions, the court consolidated both into
petitions for habeas corpus, to which the government responded by moving to
dismiss on jurisdictional grounds.7
The court in Rasul held that “aliens held outside the sovereign territory of
the United States [cannot] use the courts of the United States to pursue claims
brought under the U.S. Constitution.”8 Further, because of the court’s decision
that the United States was not the sovereign in Guantanamo, no U.S. court
could have jurisdiction and the actions were dismissed with prejudice.9
The Rasul court relied on Johnson v. Eisentrager,10 in which the Supreme
Court established a territorial limitation on the writ of habeas corpus. Justice
Jackson, writing for the majority in Eisentrager, stated that the Supreme Court
“has been at pains to point out it was the alien’s presence within its territorial
jurisdiction that gave the Judiciary power to act.”11 Jackson further noted,
[w]e are cited to no instance where a court, in this or any other country where
the writ is known, has issued it on behalf of an alien enemy who, at no relevant
time and in no stage of his captivity, has been within its territorial jurisdiction.

3. Joint Resolution, Authorization for Use of Military Force, S.J. Res. 23, at
http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/terrorism/sjres23.enr.html (Nov. 18, 2002).
4. Rasul, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 59-61.
5. Id. at 56.
6. Id. at 57-58. While not explicitly asking for release, the court sees the Odah complaint
as nothing more than a plain challenge to the validity and legality of their custody. The court
notes that “the federal habeas statute [is] the only lawful way for the petitioners to challenge their
confinement,” and therefore considers the case as such. Id. at 63-64 (quoting Chatman-Bey v.
Thornburgh, 864 F.2d 804, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). See also Monk v. Secretary of the Navy, 793
F.2d 364, 366 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Congress determined that habeas corpus is the appropriate
federal remedy for a prisoner who claims that he is “in custody in violation of the Constitution . . .
of the United States.”).
7. Rasul, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 58-59.
8. Id. at 56.
9. Id. at 56.
10. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
11. Id. at 771.
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Nothing in the text of the Constitution extends such a right, nor does anything
in our statutes.12

The Rasul court proceeded to determine whether the United States is the
sovereign in Guantanamo. The legal status of Gauntanamo is governed by a
lease agreement entered into by the United States and Cuba in 1903 and
extended by those countries in 1934.13 In deciding that Cuba remained the
sovereign in Guantanamo, the court looked to the plain language of the lease,
which states,
while on the one hand the United States recognizes the continuance of the
ultimate sovereignty of the Republic of Cuba over the above described areas of
land and water, on the other hand the Republic of Cuba consents that during
the period of occupation by the United States of said areas under the terms of
this agreement the United States shall exercise complete jurisdiction and
control over and within said areas.14

The court noted, “[t]he military base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, is nothing
remotely akin to a territory of the United States, where the United States
provides certain rights to the inhabitants. Rather, the United States merely
leases an area of land for use as a naval base.”15 Finally, the court cited the
only two cases dealing with the issue of sovereignty in Gauntanamo, Cuban
American Bar Assoc. v. Christopher16 and Bird v. U.S.,17 in which the base was
held to be the sovereign territory of Cuba.18
In Rasul, the District Court took a literalist and elementary approach in
writing its opinion, systematically stating the basic rule of Eisentrager, and
looking directly to the plain language of the governing lease for the answer.
Countering petitioners’ and plaintiffs’ arguments in Rasul was made easy for
three reasons: (1) there is minimal precedent in this area; (2) all opinions
12. Id. at 768.
13. See Lease to the United States of Lands in Cuba for Coaling and Naval Stations, Feb. 1623, 1903, U.S.-Cuba, T.S. No. 418; Treaty Between the United States of America and Cuba
Defining Their Relations, May 29, 1934, art. III, 48 Stat. 1682, 1683.
14. See Lease to the United States of Lands in Cuba for Coaling and Naval Stations, Feb. 1623, 1903, U.S.-Cuba, T.S. No. 418, art. III, 48 Stat. 1682.
15. Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55, 71 (D.D.C. 2002). Cf. Coalition of Clergy v. Bush,
189 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1049 (C.D.Cal. 2002) (The Coalition court reasoned that “jurisdiction and
control” are not equivalent to “sovereignty” because the lease clearly distinguishes between the
two, stating that “there is a difference between territorial jurisdiction and sovereignty, and it is the
latter concept that is key.”).
16. 43 F.3d 1412, 1425 (11th Cir. 1995) (Guantanamo Bay is not a sovereign territory of the
United States simply because the United States asserts “complete jurisdiction and control.”); see
infra notes 106-110 and accompanying text.
17. 923 F. Supp. 338, 342-43 (D.Conn. 1996) (court rejected a de jure/de facto sovereignty
test in Guantanamo); see infra notes 111-115 and accompanying text.
18. See generally Vermilya Brown v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377, 380 (1948) (“The
determination of sovereignty over an area is for the legislative and executive departments.”).
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relating to these issues have been remarkably consistent; and (3) the only cases
dealing specifically with Guantanamo held it to be outside the sovereign
territory of the United States. This casenote will analyze the legal environment
of the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay and other similar bases, ultimately
deciding whether the standard set forth in Eisentrager is still appropriate.
Section I will outline the political, social, and legal atmosphere after the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, which lead to the cases at issue.
Section II will include an in-depth analysis of the relevant caselaw that
preceded Rasul. Section III will take a close look at the case, dissecting the
court’s opinion, and discussing reasons for its approach. Section IV will
identify possible theories of sovereignty and analyze how those theories are
applied to Guantanamo. Finally, Section V will propose a modification to the
rule of Eisentrager that maintains the basic boundaries of the limitation, while
providing room for judicial interpretation when dealing with ambiguous
territories.
PART I – SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT
The events of September 11, 2001, will undoubtedly go down as one of the
single greatest attacks on the United States in its 225-year history. “This was
the bloodiest day on American soil since our Civil War. . .”19 Four commercial
airplanes, “plump with fuel, ripe to explode,”20 were flown by hijackers
directly into proud symbols of U.S. capitalism and culture. “They couldn’t
carry anything—other than an atom bomb—that could be as bad as what they
were flying.”21 Two planes crashed into the World Trade Center in New York,
bringing down both towers within hours of impact.22 Another plane crashed
into the side of the Pentagon in Washington D.C. The fourth plane, intended
for the Capitol Building, was retaken by passengers and brought crashing
down in a Pennsylvania field.23 As flames billowed from the two massive
19. Nancy Gibbs, If You Want to Humble an Empire, TIME, Sept. 14, 2001, at 32, 33;
Edward T. Pound et al., Under Seige, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 24, 2001, at 8, 10.
“Nineteen men with a killer’s cold heart and a martyr’s blind will boarded four commercial
aircraft, hijacked them, then sacrificed their lives to kill, in just about an hour, twice the number
of people slain at Pearl Harbor.” Id.
20. Gibbs, supra note 19, at 34.
21. Id.
22. Id. “They made it look so easy, you wondered if the only reason the U.S. has not seen a
hijacking in 20 years was because hardly anyone was trying. It’s a wonder why not; the
Microsoft flight simulator and Fly! II—the two most popular simulators for personal computers—
allow you to pretend to fly between the World Trade Center towers, and into them.” Id. at 47.
23. Id. at 34-40. “Had [the fourth plane] stayed aloft a few seconds longer, it would have
plowed into Shanksville-Stonycreek School and its 501 students . . . There but for the grace of
God—two miles.” Gibbs, supra note 19, at 40. See also Peter Maass, When Al Qaeda Calls,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2003, at 48 (Al Jazeera reporter Yosri Fouda reported that Al Qaeda told
him the fourth plane was for the Capitol.).
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towers, the United States watched in horror as people were seen jumping to
their death, rather than suffocate from the smoke.24 “They landed with such
force, according to an eyewitness who was watching along with New York’s
mayor, Rudy Giuliani, that a pink mist of gore rose from the sidewalk as they
hit.”25 Never before had Americans seen such human peril unfurl in their own
backyard.
The final tolls were astonishing. The some 200,000 pounds of structural
steel which made up the twin towers of the World Trade Center lay in ruins.26
Thousands of Americans lost their lives, most of whose bodies were never
found or identified.27 Some companies lost nearly their entire workforce.28
“But the loss to the [New York Fire Department] known as New York’s
Bravest was unimaginable: nearly 3 percent of the entire force, including many
of the most-experienced commanders.”29 The mighty ripples of these attacks
affected the United States in a myriad of ways—psychologically, culturally,
militarily, politically, and economically.30 “The attacks will become a defining
reference point for our culture and imagination, a question of before and after,
safe and scarred.”31
The group of individuals held responsible for the horrible attacks is the
Afghanistan terrorist group known as “Al Qaeda,” a faction to which many of
the petitioners are believed to belong.32 Commentators note, “[t]his is a global

24. Jerry Adler et al., Ground Zero, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 24, 2001, at 72, 74. “The first five or
seven were dropping right out of the building, almost as if they were trying to hold onto it . . . .
As it got hotter, they’d run and leap like they wanted to get as far from the heat as they could.”
Id.
25. Id. “A few unlucky pedestrians were struck and killed by objects, including bodies,
falling from the planes or the buildings above.” Id.
26. Id. at 76. Many ironworkers that helped build the Twin Towers showed up to work 12hour volunteer shifts, “cutting steel with torches and pulling away the twisted remnants with
cranes, so the rescuers could probe deeper into the rubble. To them, this was not just a civic
disaster, but a personal insult as well.” Alder, supra note 24, at 84. “All that steel turns into
spaghetti . . . [a]nd then all of a sudden that structure is untenable, and the weight starts bearing
down on floors that were not designed to hold that weight, and you start having collapse.” Gibbs,
supra note 19, at 42.
27. Adler, supra note 24, at 74.
28. Id. The bond-trading firm of Cantor-Fitzgerald was reported to have lost 680 of 1,000
workers. Id.
29. Id. at 81. “The largest number of New York City firemen to have died in a single
disaster before [the attacks of September 11th] was 12.” Id. at 74.
30. See Sharon Begley et al., What Price Security?, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 1, 2001, at 58; Daniel
Eisenberg, The War on Terror/The Economy, TIME, Oct. 1, 2001, at 80; Michael D. Lemonick et
al., The War on Terror/Terror Weapons, TIME, Oct. 1, 2001, at 70; Jodie Morse et al., The War
on Terror/Life Resumes, TIME, Oct. 1, 2001, at 94; David Van Biema et al., The War on
Terror/Backlash, TIME, Oct. 1, 2001, at 72.
31. See Gibbs, supra note 19, at 47.
32. Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55, 59-61 (D.D.C. 2002).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

1248

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 47:1243

cultural war, pitting a pan-Islamic movement of fundamentalist extremists
against the modern world and its primary cultural engine, America, ‘the Great
Satan.’”33 Muslim fundamentalists see many Muslim governments as
“illegitimate,” and view the United States as one of their supporters.34
“Extremists see the U.S. government propping up states they regard as Muslim
in name only . . . and doing so to further their own geopolitical interests. They
perceive this as hypocrisy on the part of a nation that proclaims democracy,
liberalism, and freedom.”35 These radicals believe they are involved in a “holy
war,” or “jihad,” and seek to punish the United States.36 It is this very attribute
of the Muslim martyrdom that makes the extremists so unpredictable. “Once
you say you are in a state of jihad, then all the usual rules of society are
suspended and the danger is that social structure will end in ruins. . . .”37
Aside from any legal implications, the social setting that led to Rasul
makes this case infinitely important. First, as stated earlier, the terrorist attack
of September 11, 2001, is one of the most infamous events in world history,
not just American history. Second, these attacks against the world’s greatest
power occurred during the first year of a new presidency, that of George W.
Bush. Whether related or mere coincidence, it should be noted that Bush is the
son of the last U.S. President to attack the Middle East. Third, as stated above,
the United States faces a fanatical group of terrorists, one with no significant

There was no small irony in the fact that the world’s remaining military superpower might
have been crippled by Bin Laden, the wealthy Saudi exile thought to be living in
Afghanistan. A man whose personal safety is so compromised that he moves from hut to
hut seeking daily refuge, Bin Laden now stands as a foe who committed acts of war
Moscow never dared in 50 years of Cold War.
Pound, supra note 19, at 15.
33. John Leo, A War of Two Worlds, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 24, 2001, at 47.
34. Kenneth L. Woodward, A Peaceful Faith, A Fanatic Few, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 24, 2001, at
66, 67-68.
For nearly three decades, the Arab world has witnessed a broad Islamic revival that
established Muslim governments have systematically repressed. In moderate Muslim
nations, governing elites welcome Western support and the secular culture that goes with
it. These elites have suppressed or co-opted the popular revivalist movements – thus
opening the way for radical freelance sheiks and their terrorist networks.
Id. at 68.
35. Id. “And then there is Israel, which Islamists regard as either the surrogate for American
interests in the Middle East – especially oil – or a dupe for Zionist expansionism.” “Islamic
groups are bent on destroying the United States because ‘of our Christian faith’ . . . ‘They would
respect the U.S. much more if we did not separate God from governance – if we were in fact a
Christian state.’” “Extremists see Western culture as an imperialist acid eating away at Muslim
virtue and values.” Id.
36. Bruce W. Nelan, The Dark Side of Islam, TIME, Oct. 4, 1993, at 62.
37. Woodward, supra note 34, at 68. “When you’re fighting someone who wants to die . . .
those old-fashioned rules of war seem rather quaint.” Michael Elliot, “We Will Not Fail”, TIME,
Oct. 1, 2001, at 18, 30.
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political ties or stable location. America is fighting blindly against an
unknown opponent. All of these factors only work to sharpen the focus of the
world microscope on the United States. In a war waged because of perceived
American hypocrisy, how the United States handles this case will go a long
way in either improving, or further deteriorating the international U.S. image.
PART II: ANALYSIS OF PRIOR CASELAW
The issue of territorial limitations on an alien’s right to a writ of habeas
corpus is unique because it has not been dealt with in more than fifty years.
Even then, only a few cases spoke directly to the problem.38 Hence, the history
of this law is almost exclusively concentrated in Johnson v. Eisentrager.39
Once articulated, Eisentrager has stood alone as the standard in deciding the
preliminary question of whether federal courts have jurisdiction to hear these
cases. The law’s progression in this area can be divided along two distinct
lines, leading to the two main issues that laid the foundation for the Rasul
opinion. In analyzing these cases, courts initially must look to the territorial
limitations of the writ of habeas corpus,40 and then determine whether the
location of the alien satisfies those limitations.41
To understand the legal implications of the following cases, it is helpful to
engage in a brief discussion of the origin, purpose, and importance of the
“great constitutional privilege.”42 The writ dates back to the early part of 13th
century English law and is widely considered today as “perhaps the most
important writ known to the constitutional law of England.”43 The importance
of the writ to American law is no less profound;44 it is described as “the
38. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950); Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948); In re
Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
39. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
40. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 763; Ahrens, 335 U.S. at 188.
41. United States v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217 (1949) (Newfoundland); Vermilya-Brown Co. v.
Connell, 335 U.S. 377 (1948) (Bermuda); United States v. Corey, 232 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2000)
(Japan, Philippines); Cuban American Bar Ass’n v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412 (11th Cir. 1995)
(Guantanamo Bay); Burna v. United States, 240 F.2d 720 (4th Cir. 1957) (Okinawa); Cobb v.
United States, 191 F.2d 604 (9th Cir. 1951) (Okinawa); Bird v. United States, 923 F.Supp. 338
(D.Conn. 1996) (Guantanamo Bay).
42. Ex Parte Bollman, 8 U.S. 75, 95 (1807).
43. WRIGHT, MILLER AND COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION
2D § 4261 at n. 5.
44. Id. “Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution gives assurance that the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public
safety may require it, and its use by the federal courts was authorized [as long ago as in] . . . the
Judiciary Act of 1789.” Id. at n. 6-7. See also Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal
Court Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest for the Original Understanding of Article III, 132 U. PA. L.
REV. 741 (1984); Developments in the Law—Federal Habeas Corpus—Habeas Corpus
Procedure, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1154 (1970); Developments in the Law—Federal Habeas Corpus—
The Suspension Clause, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1263 (1970).
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primary guarantor of the fundamental right of personal liberty.”45 Although
there has been disagreement as to the source of the power to grant the writ,
recent cases have pointed to the Constitution rather than to a statute.
“[J]urisdictional statute implements the constitutional command that the writ of
habeas corpus be made available.”46
The primary federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, authorizes
any person to claim in federal court that he or she is being held “in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws . . . of the United States.”47 The purpose
of the writ of habeas corpus is to guarantee “the protection of individuals
against erosion of their right to be free from wrongful restraints upon their
liberty,”48 and to afford “a swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal
restraint or confinement.”49 The Rasul court noted the magnitude of these
cases, “which raise concerns about the actions of the Executive Branch.”50
1.

Territorial Limitation on an Alien’s Right to Petition for Habeas
Corpus

In 1948, the Supreme Court in Ahrens v. Clark51 considered for the first
time the jurisdictional limits of U.S. district courts in entertaining habeas
corpus decisions. The case arose after the United States Attorney General
ordered the deportation of 120 Germans who were found dangerous to public
peace and safety because they were citizens of a country at war with the United
States.52 While detained on Ellis Island in New York, they collectively
petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the District Court for the District of
Columbia on the grounds that they were subject to the custody and control of
the Attorney General.53 The issue was whether a district court had jurisdiction
to grant a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of those confined outside the
Establishing the foundation for
territorial borders of their district.54
Eisentrager, the Court stated that, “apart from specific exceptions created by
Congress the jurisdiction of the district courts is territorial.”55 Looking at the
45. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 401 (1963).
46. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 238 (1963).
47. 28 U.S.C. §2241 (c)(3) (2002).
48. Jones, 371 U.S. at 243.
49. Fay, 372 U.S. at 400; Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 283 (1948).
50. Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55, 59 (D.D.C. 2002); see infra note 78 and
accompanying text.
51. 335 U.S. 188 (1948).
52. Id. at 189.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 190.
55. Id. For example, “[i]t is true that [§] 5 of the Sherman Act empowers the court before
whom proceedings under [§] 4 are pending to bring in parties who reside outside the district in
which the court is held. That procedure is available in civil suits brought by the United States . . .
But since [§] 4 is limited to suits brought by the United States, [§] 5 is similarly confined.”
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language of the statute and the policy concerns behind it,56 the Court concluded
that the petitioners were in the wrong district court.57 The Supreme Court in
Ahrens held “that the jurisdiction of the District Court to issue the writ in cases
such as this is restricted to those petitioners who are confined or detained
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.”58
Two years later, the Supreme Court further refined the rule from Ahrens in
Johnson v. Eisentrager when it formulated the standard by which courts should
analyze and construe the territorial limitations of the writ.59 In this case,
twenty-one German nationals were captured while fighting the Japanese in
China after Germany surrendered. A military commission convicted them of
war crimes60 and sent them to Germany to serve out their sentences.61 The
detainees petitioned the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia for a
writ of habeas corpus, which the court dismissed on the authority of Ahrens.
The Court of Appeals reversed however, holding that “any person, including
an enemy alien, deprived of his liberty anywhere under any purported authority
of the United States is entitled to the writ if he can show that extension to his
cases of any constitutional rights or limitations would show his imprisonment
illegal.”62 The appellate court also held that “where deprivation of liberty by
an official act occurs outside the territorial jurisdiction of any District Court,
the petition will lie in the District Court which has territorial jurisdiction over
officials who have directive power over the immediate jailer.”63 Inconsistent
with Ahrens, the appellate court took a broader approach, one in which
jurisdiction could be obtained by the location of either the prisoner or the
captor.
Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 466-67 (1945). See also Robertson v. R.R.
Labor Bd., 268 U.S. 619, 622-23 (1925).
56. Ahrens, 335 U.S. at 191. As was also argued later in Eisentrager, the Court stated that
“[i]t would take compelling reasons to conclude that Congress contemplated the production of
prisoners from remote sections, perhaps thousands of miles from the District Court that issued the
writ. The opportunities for escape afforded by travel, the cost of transportation, the
administrative burden of such an undertaking negate such a purpose.” Id. See also Johnson v.
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 778-79 (1950).
57. Ahrens, 335 U.S. at 190-92.
58. Id. at 192.
59. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
60. See generally Joan Fitzpatrick, Jurisdiction of Military Commissions and the Ambiguous
War on Terrorism, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 345 (2002).
61. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 766.
62. Id. at 767 (citing Eisentrager v. Forrestal, 174 F.2d 961, 964 (D.C. Cir. 1949)).
63. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Eisentrager, 174 F.2d at 967). See generally Habeas
Corpus – Jurisdiction – District Court Has Jurisdiction to Issue Writ Although Petitioners are
Confined in Foreign Country, 63 HARV. L. REV. 531 (1950); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of
Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV.
1362, 1399-1400 (1953); Remedies Against the United States and its Officials, 70 HARV. L. REV.
827, 868-70 (1957).
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In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court tightened the rule holding that any
alien outside the sovereign territory of the United States does not have the right
to a writ of habeas corpus.
We are cited to no instance where a court, in this or any other country where
the writ is known, has issued it on behalf of an alien enemy who, at no relevant
time and in no stage of his captivity, has been within its territorial jurisdiction.
Nothing in the text of the Constitution extends such a right, nor does anything
in our statutes.64

“[T]he Court has been at pains to point out that it was the alien’s presence
within its territorial jurisdiction that gave the Judiciary power to act.”65 “We
have pointed out that the privilege of litigation has been extended to aliens,
whether friendly or enemy, only because permitting their presence in the
country implied protection.”66
In opposition, the petitioners cited two cases in which aliens captured
during World War II were afforded the opportunity to bring writs of habeas
corpus in federal court. In Ex parte Quirin,67 seven enemy German nationals
enlisted in the German Reich during World War II entered the United States
with direct orders to destroy war industries and facilities.68 Four years later, in
In re Yamashita, 69 a similar case arose involving a General of the Japanese
Army being held in the Philippines. The Eisentrager petitioners argued that
they stood in much the same position as the prisoners in Quirin and Yamashita,
and should therefore be afforded the same opportunities in federal court.
The Eisentrager Court distinguished both decisions by noting that specific
“heads of jurisdiction”70 were present in Quirin and Yamashita but were absent
64. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 768.
65. Id. at 771.
66. Id. at 777-78.
67. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
68. Id. at 7-8. The petitioners in Quirin, after receiving sabotage training in Germany, were
transported by submarine to Long Island, New York, and Ponte Verde Beach, Florida. Id. at 7.
After hiding their German infantry uniforms, they were instructed to “destroy war industries and
war facilities;” their families were to receive payment in return. Id. at 7-8. All the petitioners
were captured in New York or Chicago, and were subsequently held in the District of Columbia.
Id.
69. 327 U.S. 1 (1946). The petitioner in Yamashita was the Commanding General of the
Fourteenth Army Group of the Imperial Japanese Army in the Philippine Islands. Id. at 5. After
his surrender, the petitioner was detained in the Philippines awaiting trial by military commission.
Id.
70. See infra notes 119-120 and accompanying text. The constitutional rights afforded
aliens increase as their identification with the United States grows. Rights are increased when an
alien is present in the United States, and again when he/she declares an intent to become a citizen.
This process culminates when the alien completes the naturalization process. See Eric Bentley,
Jr., Toward an International Fourth Amendment: Rethinking Searches and Seizures Abroad After
Verdugo-Urquidez, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 329 (1994); Philip A. Hamburger, Natural
Rights, Natural Law, and American Constitutions, 102 YALE L.J. 907 (1993); Bryan William
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from the instant case, most notably the fact that petitioners in each case were
held captive in the sovereign territory of the United States.71 In Quirin, the
prisoners were held in the District of Columbia72 and in Yamashita, the
prisoners were held in the Philippines, which at the time was under the
sovereign control of the United States.73
The Eisentrager Court denied the petitions of the Germans because “these
prisoners at no relevant time were within any territory over which the United
States is sovereign, and the senses [sic] of their offense, their capture, their trial
and their punishment were all beyond the territorial jurisdiction of any court of
the United States.”74 Although the Court engaged in a thorough discussion of
the rights of non-belligerent aliens as opposed to enemy aliens,75 the true
holding of Eisentrager established presence in United States sovereign
territory as a firm prerequisite in habeas corpus cases.
In the ten years preceding Eisentrager, the United States fought a World
War, began the Cold War, and reached an all-time high of diplomatic
prudence. Preservation of national security was a primary goal of the Supreme
Court when handing down the Eisentrager opinion.76 When analyzing the
rationale for the decision, two entangled policy considerations are born from a
single overriding theme of caution. First, the Court was extremely worried
about the seemingly eminent negative effect that a contrary rule would have on
the health of the war effort:
It would be difficult to devise more effective fettering of a field commander
than to allow the very enemies he is ordered to reduce to submission to call
him to account in his own civil courts and divert his efforts and attention from
the military offensive abroad to the legal defensive at home.77

Horn, The Extraterritorial Application of the Fifth Amendment Protection Against Coerced SelfIncrimination, 2 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 367 (1992); Mark L. LaBollita, The Extraterritorial
Rights of Nonresident Aliens: An Alternative Theoretical Approach, 12 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J.
363 (1992).
71. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 780.
72. Id. at 779. One prisoner even claimed to be a citizen. As noted in Eisentrager, an
ascending scale of rights is given to aliens as their identification and connection with the United
States grows. Id. at 770.
73. Id. at 780. The Philippines were given their independence on July 4, 1946; Yamashita
was decided on February 4, 1946. Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
74. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 778.
75. Id. at 771-80.
76. Id. at 778-79.
77. Id. at 779.
To grant the writ to these prisoners might mean that our army must transport them across
the seas for hearing. This would require allocation of shipping space, guarding personnel,
billeting and rations. It might also require transportation for whatever witnesses the
prisoners desired to call as well as transportation for those necessary to defend legality of
the sentence.
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The second policy rationale aimed at minimizing or eliminating dispute
between conflicting government branches. “In establishing the territorial test,
the Court is thus able to avoid the internal governmental friction that might
occur if the judiciary were required to review the actions of the executive in
the conduct of extraterritorial military operations.”78 Again, the Court
effectively created an artificially congruent atmosphere in government, citing
national security as the central purpose. But, as will be discussed later, societal
views and the cultural backdrop have dramatically changed since 1950,
rendering the policy considerations pertinent to Eisentrager severely
diminished.79
2.

Sovereignty and What Constitutes a “Foreign Country”

As stated earlier, the Rasul court was faced with two questions, the first of
which was decided by Eisentrager, which held that sovereignty is a territorial
limitation on the writ of habeas corpus. In turn, analysis shifted toward
ascertaining the sovereign in Guantanamo. Essential to this determination is
the examination of how courts have handled other U.S. bases with similar
arrangements. Again, no cases have dealt with the specific issue of labeling a
country in the context of a habeas petition, but the ideas of sovereignty,
control, and jurisdiction remain consistent throughout.80

Id. at 778-79. This rationale was consistent with that seen in Ahrens v. Clark, a similar Supreme
Court opinion handed down just two years earlier. See supra note 56. The Eisentrager Court
also reasoned that the United States could not expect to receive reciprocal treatment from other
countries. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 779.
78. The Supreme Court, 1949 Term – Administrative Jurisdiction, 64 HARV. L. REV. 114,
154 (1950) [hereinafter The Supreme Court]. “Nor is it unlikely that the result of such enemy
litigiousness would be a conflict between judicial and military opinion highly comforting to
enemies of the United States.” Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 779. See also Rasul v. Bush, 215 F.
Supp. 2d 55, 59 (D.D.C. 2002).
79. Ominously, Justice Black’s dissent “[objected] to the Court’s distinction because it
would permit constitutional rights to vary with the choice of the executive as to the alien’s place
of imprisonment.” The Supreme Court, supra note 78, at 154. See Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 795.
80. Almost all of the cases in the next section are claims brought under the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (2000), which is a limited waiver of the United States’
sovereign immunity to civil suit. The Act contains a provision that states that the United States
shall not be liable to a claim “arising in a foreign country.” 28 U. S.C. § 2680(k) (2000). Hence,
these cases require courts to decide whether certain military bases are considered “foreign
countries,” or land subject to the sovereignty of another. See James C. Conley, Federal Tort
Claims Act – Waiver of Sovereign Immunity, 32 DUQ. L. REV. 167 (1993); Kelly McCracken,
Away from Justice and Fairness: The Foreign Country Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act,
22 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 603 (1989).
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“Possessions” v. Sovereignty Territory

In 1948, two years before Eisentrager, the Supreme Court in VermilyaBrown Co., Inc. v. Connell81 considered the legal status of United States
military bases abroad. Specifically, the Court considered whether military
bases subject to lease agreements were considered possessions of the United
States, such that U.S. courts would have jurisdiction to decide any tort claims
arising on the bases.82 The plaintiff, Connell, and others filed suit against
Vermilya-Brown Company, Inc., under the Fair Labor Standards Act83 for
recovery of overtime compensation and damages. The defendant contractor
was working for the United States on a U.S. military base in Bermuda.84 The
United States obtained the base through a lease the British government
executed, which closely resembled leases for military bases in the Philippines,
Panama and Guantanamo.85 The Court cited the words of the Secretary of
State in deciding that “[t]he arrangements under which the leased bases were
acquired from Great Britain did not and were not intended to transfer
sovereignty over the leased areas from Great Britain to the United States.”86
Further, the Court rejected the argument that having “all rights, power, and
authority” was equal to sovereignty.87 The Court ultimately held that the Fair
Labor Standards Act was applicable,88 finding the Bermuda base to be a
“possession” of the United States, while being perfectly clear that sovereignty
was not transferred by the lease.89 The decision was reinforced the following

81. 335 U.S. 377 (1948).
82. Id. at 380. See supra note 80; infra note 83.
83. 29 U.S.C. § 201 (2002). The Fair Labor Standards Act covers commerce “among the
several States or between any State and any place outside thereof.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(b) (2002).
“‘State’ means any State of the United States or the District of Columbia or any Territory or
possession of the United States.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(c) (2002).
84. Vermilya-Brown, 335 U.S. at 379.
85. Id. at 383-84 nn.4-8.
86. Id. at 380.
87. Id. at 383 n.4 (citing Agreement and exchanges of notes between United States of
America and Great Britain respecting leased naval and air bases, and protocol between the United
States of America, Great Britain, and Canada concerning the defense of Newfoundland, March
27, 1941, United States of America and Great Britain, 55 Stat. 1560.).
88. Id. at 390. “Where as here the purpose is to regulate labor relations in an area vital to our
national life, it seems reasonable to interpret its provisions to have force where the nation has sole
power, rather than to limit the coverage to sovereignty.” Vermilya-Brown, 335 U.S. at 390.
89. Id. at 386-90. The dissent, in arguing against application of the law, points out that, “[i]t
was President Roosevelt himself who determined for this country that it was the part of wisdom
neither to seek nor to accept sovereignty or supreme authority over any part of these islands.” Id.
at 393 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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year in United States v. Spelar,90 which held a U.S. military base in
Newfoundland was outside the sovereign territory of the United States.91
B.

De jure v. De facto sovereignty?

In 1951, the Ninth Circuit in Cobb v. United States, held the island of
Okinawa was a “foreign country.”92 In this case, an American citizen sued the
United States for injuries he suffered in an automobile accident under the
Federal Tort Claims Act.93 The United States took control of Okinawa
immediately following World War II, established military bases (not subject to
any lease) on the island, and expressed no intention of giving the island back to
Japan.94 By “evicting” the Japanese and “acquir[ing] the exclusive power to
control and govern the island,” the court stated, “[t]he will of the United States
is in fact the ‘supreme will’ on Okinawa.”95 This, the court concluded, vested
the United States with “de facto” sovereignty, but not “de jure” sovereignty.96
With Okinawa’s status at issue, the court decided the case almost exclusively
on the fact that pre-war Japanese or Okinawa law must apply to the case.97
Therefore, Cobb stands for a more definitive line between de facto and de jure
sovereignty, and again reinforces the idea that applicable law plays a large part
in these determinations.98

90. 338 U.S. 217 (1949).
91. See id. at 221-22. This case was brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act, and the
Court decided to employ the following two part test to decide whether the Newfoundland base
was a “foreign country”: (1) sovereignty, and (2) applicable law. See id. Vermilya-Brown
established that applicable law was an issue of great importance.
92. 191 F.2d 604, 611 (9th Cir. 1951).
93. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (2000).
94. Cobb, 191 F.2d at 605-607. Actually, the State Department had announced a policy to
remove Okinawa outside the sovereignty of Japan. Because “sovereignty is never held in
suspense” and Japan no longer has sovereignty, the court attempted to put a label on the legal
status of the island. See id. at 607.
95. Id. at 608.
96. Id. “The conqueror does not acquire the full rights of sovereignty merely by occupying
and governing the conquered territory without a formal act of annexation or at least an expression
of intention to retain the conquered territory permanently.” Id.
97. Cobb, 191 F.2d at 609-611.
“The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the
occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as
possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws
in force in the country.” In signing this treaty the United States has undertaken a duty, in
cases to which the Hague Convention is applicable, to maintain the tort law of the
occupied country.
Id. at 610 (citing the Hague Convention of 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 2306).
98. See supra note 91. But cf. Burna v. United States, 240 F.2d 720, 722 (4th Cir. 1957)
(holding that Okinawa was a “foreign country,” but somewhat belittling the importance of
applicable law, and hinting to the fact that Congress may have not intended “foreign country” to
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C. “Practical Usage and Dominion” and Concurrent Sovereignty
In 2000, the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Corey,99 held that a U.S. Air
Force Base in Japan and a private apartment in the Philippines (leased by the
United States for embassy employees) were subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States.100 The Federal District Court of Hawaii convicted the defendant
of aggravated sexual abuse. The defendant challenged U.S. jurisdiction.101
The court held that it had jurisdiction over the base and the apartment building
because they were “acquired for the use of the United States.”102 The court
applied a “practical usage and dominion” standard,103 and conceded that the
United States has considerably more power than the host country.104 Yet, this
did not amount to United States sovereignty because “[t]wo sovereignties may
exercise concurrent jurisdiction when their relationship is regulated by law.”105
Here again is another instance where U.S. courts have exercised jurisdiction in
areas realistically under the exclusive control of the United States, while
refusing to accept complete “sovereignty.”
D. Guantanamo Bay
It was not until 1995 that a federal court considered the status of the United
States Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay. In Cuban American Bar Association,
Inc. v. Christopher,106 the Eleventh Circuit considered the rights of Cuban and
Haitian immigrants who were provided safe haven at Guantanamo. In finding
that “any statutory or constitutional claim . . . must be based upon an
extraterritorial application of that statute or constitutional provision,”107 the
court held that Guantanamo was outside the sovereign territory of the United
States.108 The court looked to the plain language of the lease, which states that
Cuba remains sovereign while the United States has “complete jurisdiction and

carry with it the “fine distinctions [of] sovereignty”). See also Fuji Photo Film Co., Inc. v.
Shinohara Shoji Kabushiki Kaisha, 754 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1985).
99. 232 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2000).
100. Id. at 1183.
101. Id. at 1169.
102. Id. at 1177.
103. Id. at 1178.
104. Corey, 232 F.3d at 1181. “[T]he United States may take all the measures necessary for
their establishment, operation, safeguarding and control” at the Yokota Air Force Base. See id. at
1181. “The host country may not enter the embassy grounds without the consent of the sending
state.” Id. at 1182.
105. Id. at 1180. “[T]he American experience belies the notion that the atom of sovereignty
cannot be split.” Id.
106. 43 F.3d 1412 (11th Cir. 1995).
107. Id. at 1425.
108. Id. at 1424-25.
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control,”109 but it “disagree[d] that ‘control and jurisdiction’ is equivalent to
sovereignty.”110
This line of reasoning and the conclusion were upheld the following year
in Bird v. United States.111 In Bird, the wife of a U.S. Naval officer sued a
physician under the Federal Tort Claims Act for negligently failing to properly
diagnose her brain tumor.112 The court rejected the de jure/de facto distinction
of Cobb and Burna,113 stating that the “then-ambiguous legal status of post-war
Okinawa” is quite different than Guantanamo, which is governed by a “valid
treaty delineating the sovereignty rights.”114 Following the court in Cuban
American Bar Association, the Bird court looked to the plain language of the
lease in distinguishing “complete jurisdiction and control” from
“sovereignty.”115
3.

Conclusion of Historical Review

Eisentrager stands as a remarkably distinct, specific, and powerful
limitation on the right to petition federal courts for habeas corpus. Focus is
strictly given to the location of the individual petitioning the court, and
sovereignty is the lone determining factor. Yet, help for the courts in deciding
this issue is sparse, as the circumstances are admittedly unique. Courts must
look to how Guantanamo and other bases are regarded in cases concerning
different standards and means of analysis. Although jurisdictional conclusions
have differed depending on the statute under which they are brought, the idea
of ultimate sovereignty and the fact that the United States does not retain it in
regards to these bases is a consistent phenomenon. The fairly straight-forward
109. Lease to the United States of Lands in Cuba for Coaling and Naval Stations, Feb. 16-23,
1903, U.S.-Cuba, art. III, T.S. No. 418; see Treaty Between the United States of America and
Cuba Defining Their Relations, May 29, 1934, U.S.-Cuba, art. III, 48 Stat. 1682, 1683.
110. Cuban Am. Bar Ass’n, 43 F.3d at 1425. Courts interpreting the lease governing the
Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines reach the same result. The Republic of the Philippines
retains sovereignty, while the United States is given the “assurance of unhampered . . . military
operations.” Heller v. United States, 605 F. Supp. 144, 146 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
111. 923 F. Supp. 338 (D. Conn. 1996).
112. Id. at 339. The United States moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Id.
113. See supra notes 92-98 and accompanying text.
114. Bird, 923 F. Supp. at 342. “The conqueror does not acquire the full rights of sovereignty
merely by occupying and governing the conquered territory without a formal act of annexation or
at least an expression of intention to retain the conquered territory permanently.” Id. (citing Cobb
v. United States, 191 F.2d 604, 608 (9th Cir. 1951)).
115. Id. at 343. “The fact that the United States does not provide diplomatic recognition of
the present Cuban government does not bar the validity of the treaties it previously entered into
with this sovereign nation.” Id. at 341. “In addition, the fact that Cuba has been excluded from
Guantanamo for over ninety years and that the government of Cuba changed in 1959 has no effect
on Cuba’s status as the ‘ultimate sovereign’ of Guantanamo Bay.” Id. at n.10 (citing United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316-17 (1936)).
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language of the leases along with the sheer number of similar arrangements
around the world gives courts ample room to analogize and agree.
PART III: CRITICAL EVALUATION OF RASUL
1.

Rasul v. Bush116

The court decided Rasul pursuant to the standard set out in Johnson v.
Eisentrager. 117 As stated earlier, Eisentrager stands for the proposition that
the right to petition federal courts for a writ of habeas corpus is afforded only
when the alien held is within the sovereign territory of the United States.118
For the application of the Eisentrager standard to have been correct in Rasul,
the court must have identified the petitioners and plaintiffs (“petitioners”) as
aliens. The Eisentrager court noted the distinctions between citizens and
aliens, and the resulting hierarchy in applicable rights.119 Consequently, the
Rasul court pointed out that the Guantanamo detainees did not seek to become
citizens, did not assert any previous presence or a present intention to enter the
United States, and are aliens in the most elementary and literal of senses.120
The petitioners in Rasul did not dispute their alien status or the fact that
Guantanamo is not a part of the sovereign territory of the United States, but
rather chose to pursue more technical arguments.121 First, Petitioners argued

116. 215 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2002). As mentioned earlier, the Rasul court considered
both the Rasul petition and the Odah complaint as petitions for a writ of habeas corpus. For an
extended discussion of the writ of habeas corpus, see supra notes 42-50 and accompanying text.
117. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
118. Id. at 777-78 (“[T]he privilege of litigation has been extended to aliens, whether friendly
or enemy, only because permitting their presence in the country implied protection. No such
basis can be invoked here, for these prisoners at no relevant time were within any territory over
which the United States is sovereign . . . .”).
119. Id. at 769. See supra note 70. Justice Jackson, writing for the majority, stated that “[t]he
alien, to whom the United States has been traditionally hospitable, has been accorded a generous
and ascending scale of rights as he increases his identity with our society.” Eisentrager, 339 U.S.
at 770. “For example, presence within the country provides an alien with certain rights that
expand and become more secure as he or she declares an intent to become a citizen, culminating
in the full panoply of rights afforded to the citizen upon the alien’s naturalization.” Rasul, 215 F.
Supp. 2d at 66 (citing Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 770).
120. Id.
121. Although the conclusion is substantially the same, the court opinion in Rasul has a
decidedly different tone and approach than that of the U.S. District Court of California in
Coalition of Clergy v. Bush, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1036 (C.D. Cal. 2002). The petitioners in Coalition
posed flimsy theoretical arguments, long on “swaggering,” “tyrants,” and extended Rolling
Stones references, which fell short on substance. Albeit a valiant effort, this seemed to annoy the
California court, which effortlessly countered some points, while refusing to even recognize
others. Petitioner’s Response to Respondents’ Response to Order to Show Cause Regarding
Jurisdiction at 4-5, Coalition of Clergy v. Bush, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1036 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (No. Civ.
–02-0 0570-AHM (JTLx)), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

1260

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 47:1243

that Eisentrager is distinguishable on its facts because the petitioners in that
case were considered “enemy” aliens.122 The detainees were Kuwaiti nationals
and suspected terrorists from Afghanistan, citizens of countries with which the
United States was not at war. The Rasul court emphatically disagreed, stating
“[t]he Supreme Court’s conclusion in Eisentrager . . . did not hinge on the fact
that the petitioners were enemy aliens, but on the fact that they were aliens
outside territory over which the United States was sovereign.”123 “[T]he
Supreme Court has consistently taken the position that Eisentrager does not
apply only to those aliens deemed to be ‘enemies’ by a competent tribunal.”124
As if the sweeping nature of the rule was still in doubt, the court pointed to
Justice Black’s dissent in Eisentrager for further proof.125
To conclude the point, the court discussed the two-dimensional paradigm
Eisentrager created.126 On the one hand, if the person in question has some
sort of connection with the United States, courts will focus on the status of the
individual.127 On the other hand, if the person is an alien, courts will focus on

cltnbsh020802rsp2osc.pdf; see Coalition, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 1036. Petitioners and plaintiffs in
Rasul, however, hang their hat on two distinct, more concrete notions. Although the court rejects
these contentions, the visibly more tolerant tenor of the opinion suggests that the arguments at
least inch closer to hitting the target. Rasul, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 66-69.
122. Id. at 66-68. “[T]he nonresident enemy alien, especially one who has remained in the
service of the enemy, does not have . . . this qualified access to our courts, for he neither has
comparable claims upon our institutions nor could his use of them fail to be helpful to the
enemy.” Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 776. “‘A lawful residence implies protection . . .’” Id.
(quoting Clarke v. Morey, 10 Johns. 69, 72 (N.Y. 1813).
123. Rasul, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 67. “We have pointed out that the privilege of litigation has
been extended to aliens, whether friendly or enemy, only because permitting their presence in the
country implied protection.” Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 777-78.
124. Rasul, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 67 (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001), which
held that “certain constitutional protections available to persons inside the United States are
unavailable to aliens outside of our geographic borders”; also citing United States v. VerdugoUrquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990), which held that aliens outside territorial borders of the United
States do not have Fifth Amendment rights).
125. Id. at 68.
If the [majority’s] opinion thus means, and it apparently does, that these petitioners are
deprived of the privilege of habeas corpus solely because they were convicted and
imprisoned overseas, the Court is adopting a broad and dangerous principle . . . . [T]he
Court’s opinion inescapably denies courts power to afford the least bit of protection for
any alien who is subject to our occupation government abroad, even if he is neither enemy
nor belligerent and even after peace is officially declared.
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 795-96.
126. Rasul, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 68.
127. When courts determine an alien’s identification with the United States, they can also
ascertain which rights are applicable. See supra notes 70, 119.
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the “situs”128 of the individual.129 Hence, aliens held outside the sovereign
territory of the United States, as with petitioners in Rasul, are not allowed to
petition U.S. courts.130 If the synopsis of this part of the court’s opinion seems
rather matter-of-fact, it was no mistake. The court saw this argument as
inadequate on its face, methodically lining up its arsenal of support.
Petitioners’ second argument was that the United States exercised de facto
sovereignty over the Guantanamo base “due to the unique nature of the control
and jurisdiction.”131 They pointed to Ralpho v. Bell,132 a case involving a
claim brought under the Micronesian Claims Act of 1971.133 Although the
United States was not the sovereign in Micronesia, the District of Columbia
Circuit found that the Due Process Clause protected the Plaintiff.134 Petitioners
argued that if constitutional rights are extended to the Plaintiff in Ralpho, an
alien outside the sovereign territory of the United States, then the same
opportunity should be afforded to those in places where the United States is the
de facto sovereign.135
The court pointed out that Ralpho did not hold that an area of de facto
sovereignty carries with it constitutional rights; Ralpho was merely a “limited
extension of the uncontested proposition that aliens residing in the sovereign
territories of the United States are entitled to certain basic constitutional
rights.”136 The United States held Micronesia in trust, and the Ralpho court
considered it to be equivalent to Puerto Rico or Guam.137 In contrast, the

128. Situs: “The location or position (of something) for legal purposes, as in lex situs, the law
of the place where the thing in issue is situated.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1392 (7th ed.
1999).
129. Rasul, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 68.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 69.
132. 569 F.2d 607 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
133. Rasul, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 69-70. The Micronesian Claims Act was enacted by the
United States Congress to establish “a fund for compensation of losses incurred by Micronesians
during World War II.” Ralpho, 569 F.2d at 611.
134. Rasul, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 69 (citing Ralpho, 569 F.2d at 618-19). The United States
government was “answerable to the United Nations for its treatment of Micronesians,” and felt
that it “has a duty toward the people of the Trust Territory to govern them with no less
consideration than it would govern any part of its sovereign territory.” Ralpho, 569 F.2d at 61819, n.72. “[T]he Ralpho [c]ourt treated Micronesia as the equivalent of a United States territory,
such as Puerto Rico or Guam.” Rasul, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 70.
135. Rasul, 215 F. Supp. 2d. at 69-70.
136. Id. at 70. “That the United States is answerable to the United Nations for its treatment of
the Micronesians does not give Congress greater leeway to disregard the fundamental rights and
liberties of a people as much American subjects as those in other American territories.” Ralpho,
569 F.2d at 619.
137. Rasul, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 70. The court also distinguished Micronesia because no other
nation retained sovereignty over the territory and the United States had “‘full powers of
administration, legislation, and jurisdiction over the territory . . .’” Id. (quoting Trusteeship

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

1262

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 47:1243

Rasul court stated that Guantanamo “is nothing remotely akin to a territory of
the United States, where the United States provides certain rights to the
inhabitants. Rather, the United States merely leases an area of land for use as a
naval base.”138
The court also pointed to two other cases, not cited by petitioners, in which
a de facto sovereignty test for Guantanamo was denied.139 In Bird,140 the
Plaintiff attempted to define the United States’ “unique territorial status” in
Guantanamo as de facto sovereignty.141 The court held that the plain language
of the lease established Cuba’s de jure sovereignty over the base, rendering the
consideration of de facto sovereignty moot.142 In Cuban American Bar
Association v. Christopher,143 the Eleventh Circuit stated, “[w]e disagree that
‘control and jurisdiction’ is equivalent to sovereignty. . . . [W]e again reject
the argument that our leased military bases abroad which continue under the
sovereignty of foreign nations, hostile or friendly, are ‘functionally equivalent’
to being . . . the United States.”144
PART IV: ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT LAW
Pursuant to Eisentrager, the right of an alien to bring a writ of habeas
corpus depends on three things: location, location, location. Eisentrager
establishes a bright-line rule that completely hinges on a single word:
sovereignty. In fact, the Supreme Court even had the foresight to create a
standard effectively outside of their judicial interpretive powers. “Who is
sovereign . . . is not a judicial, but a political question, the determination of
which by the legislative and executive departments of any government
conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other officers, citizens, and
subjects of that government.”145
The question that should be asked is, while the application of other statutes
and constitutional rights afford courts the opportunity for substantial judicial
interpretation, why is the law in regards to the writ of habeas corpus so cut and
dry? Are the courts protective of a right of such considerable importance? Do
the courts fear that extending the right will result in a windfall, such that
anyone, anywhere, can question and challenge the authority of the United
Agreement for the Former Japanese Mandated Islands Approved at the One Hundred and
Twenty-Fourth Meeting of the Security Council, July 18, 1947, art. 3, 61 Stat. 3301).
138. Id. at 71.
139. Id. (citing Bird v. United States, 923 F. Supp. 338 (D. Conn. 1996); Cuban Am. Bar
Ass’n, Inc. v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412 (11th Cir. 1995)).
140. See supra notes 111-115 and accompanying text.
141. Rasul, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 71.
142. Bird, 923 F. Supp. at 343.
143. See supra notes 106-110 and accompanying text.
144. Cuban Am. Bar Ass’n, 43 F.3d at 1425.
145. Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890).
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States to hold them captive? Or is this just a stodgy, outdated law that should
be taken off the shelf, dusted, and remodeled?
1.

Guantanamo Lease

The logical beginning to any discussion of the sovereign in Guantanamo is
the lease itself. The United States originally entered into the lease with Cuba
in 1903.146 The 1903 agreement stated:
While on the one hand the United States recognizes the continuance of the
ultimate sovereignty of the Republic of Cuba over the above described areas of
land and water, on the other hand the Republic of Cuba consents that during
the period of occupation by the United States of said areas under the terms of
this agreement the United States shall exercise complete jurisdiction and
control over and within said areas . . . .147

In 1934, the lease was amended to provide that it shall “continue in effect”
until both parties agree to its modification or cessation.148 The lease clearly
distinguishes between “sovereignty” and “complete jurisdiction and control,”
which other courts have cited as being dispositive.149 As stated in Cuban
American Bar Association, “[w]e disagree that ‘control and jurisdiction’ is
equivalent to sovereignty.”150 The Guantanamo lease is certainly not alone in
this distinction. One need only look to other leases governing U.S. military
bases around the world to see striking similarities.151
In analyzing the Bermuda lease, the dissent in Vermilya-Brown Co. v.
Connell noted that this distinction was not a mistake:
146. See Lease to the United States of Lands in Cuba for Coaling and Naval Stations, Feb. 1623, 1903, U.S.-Cuba, T.S. No. 418.
147. Id. at art. III.
148. Treaty Between the United States of America and Cuba Defining Their Relations, May
29, 1934, U.S.-Cuba, art. III, 48 Stat. 1682, 1683.
149. See Cuban Am. Bar Ass’n, 43 F.3d at 1425; Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55, 71-72
(D.D.C. 2002); Coalition of Clergy v. Bush, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1049-50 (C.D. Cal. 2002);
Bird v. United States, 923 F. Supp. 338, 343 (D. Conn. 1996).
150. 43 F.3d at 1425.
151. In Bermuda, the United States has “all the rights, power and authority . . . for the
establishment, use, operation and defense [sic] thereof, or appropriate for their control.” Great
Britain, Canada-Naval and Air Bases, Mar. 27, 1941, U.S.-Gr. Brit.-Can., art. I, 55 Stat. 1560. In
Guantanamo, the United States has “complete jurisdiction and control.” Lease to the United
States of Lands in Cuba for Coaling and Naval Stations, Feb. 16-23, 1903, U.S.-Cuba, art. III,
T.S. No. 418. In Panama, the United States has “all the rights, power and authority . . . which the
United States would possess and exercise if it were the sovereign. . . .” Isthmian Canal
Convention, Nov. 18, 1903, U.S.-Pan., art. III, 33 Stat. 2234, 2235. See Vermilya-Brown Co. v.
Connell, 335 U.S. 377, 380-88 n.4-8 (1949); see also Heller v. United States, 605 F. Supp. 144,
146 (E.D. Penn. 1985) (governing Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines is a lease that states,
“[t]he Base Commanders and United States Commanders shall be guided by full respect for
Philippine sovereignty on the one hand and the assurance of unhampered United States military
operations on the other.”).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

1264

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 47:1243

But it was President Roosevelt himself who determined for this country that it
was the part of wisdom neither to seek nor to accept sovereignty or supreme
authority over any part of these islands. He decided that it was in our selfinterest to limit the responsibilities of the United States strictly to
establishment, maintenance and operation of military, naval and air
installations . . . . Thus it was settled American policy, grounded, as I think, on
the highest wisdom, that, whatever technical form the transaction should take,
we should acquire no such responsibilities as would require us to import to
those islands our laws, institutions and social conditions beyond the necessities
of controlling a military base. . . .152

Drafter’s intent is normally afforded considerable deference by the court, and
the intent of President Theodore Roosevelt in contracting these leases is
evident; the United States did not intend to become sovereign of these areas.153
But, should the inquiry stop there? Are the political boundaries of 100 years
ago still appropriate? Answers to those questions inevitably lie in the
definition of sovereignty and the actual conditions in Guantanamo.
2.

Sovereignty Defined

Sovereignty: n.: 1. Supreme dominion, authority, or rule. 2. The supreme
political authority of an independent state. 3. The state itself.154
Unfortunately, the definition of sovereignty provides little help in practical
application because it begs the question of what “supreme dominion” or
“supreme political authority” actually entails. Sovereignty is an elusive term
and, to put it politely, one of minimal concreteness but of great significance.
As with most legal terms, there are various philosophies that lead to differing
levels of structure. This uncertainty is cause for heated debate, because with
sovereignty comes immense power, extensive rights, and far-reaching
obligations.155 There are basically two ways to look at sovereignty: (1)
through citizenry, national identity, and social factors,156 and (2) through an
examination of the specific powers asserted.157 In order to determine who
should be considered the sovereign in Guantanamo, courts must examine the
relevance and effects of both competing means of analysis.

152. Vermilya-Brown, 335 U.S. at 393-94 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
153. Id.
154. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 128, at 1402.
155. See generally STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY (1999);
Jack Goldsmith, Sovereignty, International Relations Theory, and International Law, 52 STAN. L.
REV. 959 (2000) (reviewing Krasner’s above-cited book).
156. See Kim Rubenstein & Daniel Adler, International Citizenship: The Future of
Nationality in a Globalized World, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 519 (2000).
157. See Randy E. Barnett, Constitutional Legitimacy, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 111 (2003);
Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the
Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2002).
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Sovereignty: The National Identity Approach

In analyzing a sovereign state, one approach is to look intrinsically at the
make-up, or guts, of the specific entity. This is to say that some commentators
have defined sovereignty by its citizenry, culture, and national identity.
“[C]itizenship in a bound political community, with shared cultural interests, is
the basis for sovereignty . . . .”158 This theory would suggest that sovereignty
is an adaptive concept, one that changes color and tone in accordance with
people’s values. Further, a nation claiming sovereignty over a new territory
would require exposing, or some would say imposing, its political ideals and
cultural norms on the new territory. President Roosevelt cited this as a specific
motivating factor for refusing sovereignty in drafting the military base leases:
His reasons have been partially disclosed and one of them . . . was the great
disparity of social, economic and labor conditions between the islands and our
Continent. Also he knew full well the different customs and institutions
prevailing there, particularly the relations between the white, colored and
native races, and the difficulty of assimilating them into the American pattern
– a prospect that would arouse emotional tensions in this country as well as in
the Islands . . . .159

Yet, a modern trend in globalization, seen in all facets of life, inevitably
takes its toll on any definitive lines of nationality. “Globalization strains the
ideals so that people redefine groups based on culture, religion, moral and
political values, instead of defining groups based on the division of borders.”160
“Nation-states are altered by the growth and interconnection of relationships
with other nation-states . . . as a result altering sovereignty . . . .”161 As early as
1949, a year before Eisentrager, certain members of the Supreme Court noted
this trend. “The very concept of ‘sovereignty’ is in a state of more or less
solution these days.”162 Clearly, as the idea of strictly defined national
identities dissipates, so too should its weight as an indicator of sovereignty.

158. Danielle S. Petito, Comment, Sovereignty and Globalization: Fallacies, Truth, and
Perception, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 1139, 1140 (2001) (citing Rubenstein & Adler, supra
note 156, at 543).
159. Vermilya-Brown, Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377, 393-94 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Justice Jackson also wrote the majority opinion a year later in Eisentrager.
160. Petito, supra note 158, at 1142-43 (citing NIKOS PAPASTERGIADIS, THE TURBULENCE
OF MIGRATION 87 (2000)). “A ‘modernized’ definition of sovereignty demands concern for a
wide-range of social issues, cultural identity, ethnic identity, and justice, which affords individual
connections to the society, politics, and culture of each individual situation.” Petito, supra note
158, at 1141 (citing Rubenstein & Adler, supra note 156, at 519, 546).
161. Petito, supra note 158, at 1140-41 (citing Rubenstein & Adler, supra note 156, at 526).
162. United States v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217, 224 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Curiously, Justice Frankfurter joined the majority opinion in Eisentrager.
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Sovereignty: The Attribute Approach

As stated above, the national identity approach looks to define sovereignty
by its internal parts, or the make-up of the nation-state. Inversely, the attribute
approach takes an external view by analyzing the nation-state by the powers it
asserts on others.163 Hence, the attribute approach is less a claim of
sovereignty and more an identification of sovereignty by action. Courts and
commentators have characterized these powers as “attributes of
sovereignty.”164 Examples would include: (1) the right to declare war,
conclude peace, and make treaties;165 (2) the right to regulate conduct by law
to the exclusion of jurisdiction of other states;166 (3) the right to make searches
and to effect seizures;167 (4) the right to expel or exclude aliens,168 and (5) the
right to levee taxes and raise funds.169 In analyzing Guantanamo, the issues are
whether the United States asserts the aforementioned powers, and whether they
do so alone.
(i) Applicable Law in Guantanamo
The United States asserts the full spectrum of laws to all situations or
circumstances arising on or from the Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay.
Obviously, it should be no surprise that the United States applies U.S. military
law to its personnel for acts committed in Guantanamo.170 But, the United
States goes further, applying criminal law to civilians on the base,171 criminal
law to aliens on the base,172 civil law to both,173 and tax law to individuals
163. See generally Cleveland, supra note 157.
164. Laura S. Adams, Divergence and the Dynamic Relationship Between Domestic
Immigration Law and International Human Rights, 51 EMORY L. J. 983, 997 (2002); Howard O.
Hunter, Federalism and State Taxation of Multistate Enterprises, 32 EMORY L. J. 89, 112-13
(1983); Cleveland, supra note 157; infra notes 165-169.
165. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936).
166. BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1020 (3d ed. 1999)
[hereinafter CARTER & TRIMBLE].
167. United States v. Wilmot, 29 C.M.R. 514, 517 (C.M.A. 1960).
168. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953).
169. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 855 n.6 (1995).
170. United States v. Elmore, 56 M.J. 533 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2001); Wilmot, 29 C.M.R.
514; United States v. Bobroff, 23 M.J. 872 (C.M.R. 1987).
171. United States v. Rogers, 388 F.Supp. 298 (E.D.Va. 1975) (prosecuting civilian serving
on the base for cocaine possession).
172. United States v. Lee, 906 F.2d 117 (4th Cir. 1990) (prosecuting Jamaican national for
sexually abusing a child on the Guantanamo base). “[B]oth United States citizens and aliens
alike, charged with the commission of crimes on Guantanamo Bay, are prosecuted under United
States laws.” See Haitian Centers Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1326, 1342 (2nd Cir. 1992),
vacated as moot.
173. Skip Kirchdorfer, Inc. v. United States, 6 F.3d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (finding that United
States committed per se taking compensable under Fifth Amendment when U.S. Navy broke into
subcontractor’s warehouse); Nielsen v. Secretary of Treasury, 424 F.2d 833 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
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employed on the base.174 There seem to be no boundaries to the assertion of
United States law in Guantanamo. To be sure, this fact speaks volumes about
the United States’ true presence in Guantanamo. A few courts, including the
Supreme Court, have clearly or implicitly stated that applicable law means
everything in these cases.175
First, the Supreme Court in United States v. Spelar176 came up with a twopart test for considering the “foreign country exception”177 of the Federal Tort
Claims Act.178 Part II of the test addressed the question of whether the United
States would be subject to the laws of a foreign power.179 The Court found
that the purpose of the exception was “to avoid subjecting the United States to
liabilities depending upon the laws of a foreign power.”180 Hence, the Court
explicitly stated the importance of applicable law, noting that it was imperative
both in the drafting of the Act, and in deciding whether the leased territory is a
“foreign country.”
Second, the Ninth Circuit in Cobb v. United States181 discussed the ideas of
de facto and de jure sovereignty. The court applied the Spelar test, and found
that “[t]he United States has therefore acquired . . . what may be termed a ‘de
facto sovereignty’” over Okinawa.182 But, in applying part II of the test as
(applying U.S. commercial law to Cubans of Cuban corporation supplying water to Guantanamo
base).
174. Wanda Faye Alberts v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 665 (1986)
(finding Petitioner liable for failing to report income received from employment on Guantanamo
base).
175. See supra notes 91, 97-98.
176. 338 U.S. 217 (1949).
177. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (2000). For a discussion of the function and importance of the
exception, see supra note 80.
178. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (2000). In this case, an administratrix of an estate sued the United
States for the death of the decedent in an airplane crash on the U.S. air base in Newfoundland.
The United States leased this base from Great Britain on essentially the same terms as the
Guantanamo base lease. See Spelar, 338 U.S. at 218-19 (citing Vermilya-Brown v. Connell, 335
U.S. 377, 383 n.4 (1949) (“The United States shall have all the rights, power and authority within
the Leased Areas which are necessary for the establishment, use, operation and defence thereof,
or appropriate for their control . . . .”).
179. Spelar, 338 U.S. at 221. Part I is whether the claim arose in a territory subject to the
sovereignty of a foreign country. See id. at 219.
180. Id. at 221.
181. 191 F.2d 604 (9th Cir. 1951). The United States had obtained total control of Okinawa
as a result of World War II, and had expressed no intention of giving it back. This somewhat
parallels the situation in Guantanamo because the United States asserts complete control
indefinitely. Id. at 607.
182. Id. at 608. Part I of the test required the court to determine the sovereign in Okinawa.
The court noted that unlike Newfoundland, which was clearly under the sovereignty of Great
Britain, Okinawa’s sovereign was in doubt because Japan had been stripped of the title. Hence,
part I of the test gave no satisfactory answer, and the court had to then turn to part II. Id. at 60708.
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mentioned above, the court ultimately found that Okinawa was a foreign
country because Japanese law would still apply.183 The court again
distinguished another territory because of applicable law, therefore recognizing
its significance.
The only remaining question is whether the United States asserts its laws
exclusively in Guantanamo, or whether Cuban laws would apply as well. No
court has ever applied, or even recognized, any sort of Cuban law to an act
occurring at the Guantanamo base. At the end of the opinion, the Rasul court
noted that petitioners might have a remedy in international law, but cited no
specific forum.184 No other case mentions the rights or options of anyone
trying to bring a claim arising on these leased bases, and logic would tend to
say that an American or alien in Guantanamo would receive no relief from the
Cuban Government. In fact, Cuban nationals who fled their country, were
intercepted by the United States, and subsequently detained at Guantanamo,
were not allowed to reenter Cuba even upon their request.185
It seems clear that the United States asserts the sovereign attribute of
regulating conduct exclusively on the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay.
No evidence to the contrary could lead to any different conclusion. U.S. courts
emphatically put a premium on applicable law as a factor in deciding whether a
territory is a “foreign country.” The law of Guantanamo is undoubtedly the
law of the United States.
(ii) The Right to Exclude
“Our cases ‘have long recognized the power to expel or exclude aliens as a
fundamental sovereign attribute . . . .’”186 “[T]he power to expel undesirable
aliens . . . [is] inherently inseparable from the conception of nationality.”187
Besides the fact that this principle is deeply rooted in American law, the right
to expel aliens is especially significant because of its international qualities; it
is an affirmative showing of authority readily visible on a world stage. The
assertion of this right is, in effect, claiming supreme authority over the
territory.
As to Guantanamo, inferential analysis of the relevant caselaw and public
information is required to reach a conclusion. In Cuban American Bar
183. Id. at 609.
184. Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55, 73 (D.C. 2002). See also Coalition of Clergy v.
Bush, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1050 (C.D.Cal. 2002). The Coalition court suggested that the
Geneva Convention could be a possible source of relief, but noted that “[r]ights of alien enemies
are vindicated under it only through protests and intervention of protecting powers as the rights of
our citizens against foreign governments are vindicated only by Presidential intervention.” Id.
185. Cuban Am. Bar Ass’n v. Christopher, Inc., 43 F.3d 1412, 1417-18 (11th Cir. 1995).
186. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (quoting Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel.
Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953)).
187. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 314, 318 (1936).
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Association, the United States held thousands of Cuban nationals in a safe
haven at Guantanamo after they were intercepted trying to migrate to the
United States.188 Although “the [United States] has offered the Cuban
migrants safe haven for as long as the migrants wished,”189 “[t]he
government’s position is that it could return the migrants to Cuba legally
without a migrant’s request.”190 Hence, although not asserted, the U.S.
government clearly maintained that it held the sovereign right to expel the
Cubans from Guantanamo at any time.
Analysis of United States procedure on the base provides evidence of a
more telling sort. In the early 1960s, the United States was preparing to assist
in the overthrow of Fidel Castro and the Cuban government (Bay of Pigs).191
In preparation for a Cuban denunciation of the Guantanamo base
arrangements, the United States released rules of engagement for the U.S.
military to counter any attack:
If Cuba were to denounce and repudiate the arrangements by which the United
States has a base at Guantanamo, the United States would be on strong ground
to assert (1) that the Cuban denunciation and repudiation were ineffective; (2)
that we retained our base rights; and (3) that we would be justified in resisting
with force any attempt to evict our armed forces from the base. These
conclusions stem from the following considerations: (a) The right of the
United States in Guantanamo is more than a right to maintain a base on
territory under the sovereignty of Cuba and governed by Cuban law; by
international agreement and treaty the United States obtained the lease of a
defined area and received from Cuba the right of “complete jurisdiction and
control” in that area. (b) No date was set for the termination of these rights,
and the relevant international instruments specify that they are to continue until
modified or abrogated by agreement between the United States and Cuba.192

Oddly enough, the United States’ arguments to justify their right to forcefully
remain in Guantanamo mirror the arguments made by the Petitioners in Bird193
and Cuban American Bar Association194 for United States sovereignty over the

188.
text.
189.
190.
191.

Cuban Am. Bar Ass’n, 43 F.3d at 1417-18; see supra notes 106-110 and accompanying

Cuban Am. Bar Ass’n, 43 F.3d at 1418.
Id.
TRUMBULL HIGGINS, THE PERFECT FAILURE: KENNEDY, EISENHOWER, AND THE CIA
AT THE BAY OF PIGS (1987).
192. Memorandum From the Deputy Legal Adviser Meeker to Secretary of State Rusk. (on
file with the Department of State), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/ops/policy/docs/frusX/
301_315.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2003).
193. Bird v. United States, 923 F. Supp. 338, 340-41 (D.Conn. 1996); see supra notes 111115 and accompanying text.
194. Cuban Am. Bar Ass’n, 43 F.3d at 1424-25; see supra notes 106-110 and accompanying
text.
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base.195 Of course, these were released forty years ago in preparation for
possible warfare. But, there have been no signs of improvement in relations
between the United States and Cuba. Beginning in 1961 and until 1999, the
United States used approximately 50,000 antipersonnel and antitank mines
along the perimeter of its facilities at Guantanamo Bay.196
The United States has made it quite clear, both inferentially and explicitly,
that it intends to assert the sovereign right of exclusion on the Guantanamo
base. There is no doubt that any undesirable alien, Cuban or otherwise, would
not be allowed to enter the Guantanamo base without the specific authorization
of the U.S. government or its military. It should not be forgotten that this is a
military base, and additional safety measures are more than reasonable for
national security purposes. But the excess guarding of this particular
perimeter, along with the history of tensions between the two governments,
inevitably supports the argument that the United States asserts the right of
exclusion.
(iii) Right of Search and Seizure
“The right to make searches and to effect seizures is the right of the
sovereign.”197 In United States v. Wilmot,198 the Court of Military Appeals
considered whether the Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act199 applied to the
Yokota Air Force Base in Japan. In finding that the Act did not apply because
the Yokota base was not a territory under the “control or jurisdiction” of the
United States, the Military Board of Review distinguished the Guantanamo
base because there the United States was “at least technically sovereign.”200
On review, the Military Court of Appeals reversed, stating: (1) there was no
difference between the bases; (2) these bases were under the “control and
jurisdiction” of the United States, and (3) the United States had the right to
control drug flow by search and seizure.201 “The United States was granted the
exclusive power to conduct searches and make seizures of persons and
property within the physical areas granted to it.”202 Although this case does
195. The lease gave the United States “complete jurisdiction and control,” or seemingly
something more than that, indefinitely.
196. Use of Antipersonnel Landmines, Human Rights Watch, available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/uslm/USALM007-06.htm#P572_74029 (last visited Feb. 28,
2003).
197. United States v. Wilmot, 29 C.M.R. 514, 517 (C.M.A. 1960).
198. Id.
199. 21 U.S.C. §§ 171-85 (2000). “A person violates the narcotic import act if he
fraudulently or knowingly ‘imports or brings any narcotic drug into the United States or any
territory under its control or jurisdiction.’” See Wilmot, 29 C.M.R. at 515 (quoting § 174 of the
Drug Import Act).
200. Id. at 517.
201. Id. at 517-19.
202. Id. at 517.
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not specifically deal with a search and seizure at Guantanamo, there again
seems no doubt that the United States could assert this sovereign power.
(iv) Other Considerations
In addition to the assertion of certain attributes of sovereignty, the United
States exercises other powers normally reserved for a territory’s governing
body. The United States, explicitly or implicitly, applies U.S. labor laws,203
commercial rights,204 and property rights.205 It also seems that the United
States can move the detainees without having to go through foreign customs
procedures. Both the Ahrens and Eisentrager opinions cite the difficulties of
transporting the detainees and the hampering effect it would have on the war
effort as reasons for instituting this standard.206 Yet, when elaborating on the
cumbersome process, neither court mentions any sort of extradition
proceedings. Unfortunately, information regarding U.S. operations in
Guantanamo is limited because of its military nature. But, from what can be
discerned, Cuban rights are neither exercised nor recognized in Guantanamo.
PART V: MODIFYING EISENTRAGER
As stated earlier, Eisentrager sets forth a bright-line rule that an alien
petitioning the federal courts for a writ of habeas corpus must be within the
sovereign territory of the United States. A standard based on sovereignty is
rigid, lasting, and unwavering. “Sovereignty is never held in suspense.”207
“Rulers come and go; governments end and forms of government change; but
sovereignty survives.”208 As stated earlier, sovereignty has become an
increasingly hollow term, with its internal components being discarded

203. See Vermilya-Brown v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377, 386 (1949) (applying Fair Labor
Standards Act to Bermuda base, which the majority pointed out is essentially the same as
Guantanamo); Vega-Mena v. United States, 990 F.2d 684, 690 n.6 (1st Cir. 1993) (citing 42
U.S.C. §1651, Longshoreman’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act applies to Guantanamo
Bay).
204. See Vermilya-Brown, 335 U.S. at 390-409 (Jackson, J. dissenting). Jackson argued in his
dissent that the Bermuda base was not a “possession” because Great Britain retained commercial
rights. The majority held that these were “possessions,” inferring that the United States may
assert some commercial rights. Id. As stated earlier, the court held the Bermuda lease was
almost identical to the Guantanamo lease. See also Nielson v. Sec’y of Treasury, 424 F.2d 833,
836-38 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (United States froze assets of Cuban company that supplied water to
Guantanamo, citing the Trading with Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. app. §5 (2000)).
205. See Skip Kirchdorfer, Inc. v. United States, 6 F.3d 1573, 1580-83 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (U.S.
Navy asserted property rights by committing a per se taking of subcontractor’s warehouse
compensable under the 5th Amendment).
206. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 778-79 (1950); Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188,
191 (1948); see supra notes 56, 77.
207. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 317 (1936)
208. Id. at 316.
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gradually by globalization and international assimilation. A half-century after
Eisentrager, the Supreme Court will be called upon again to consider this
question, and the need for a more workable, practical, and realistic standard is
clear. Yet, in doing so, the Court must be careful not to overly extend the
boundaries of U.S. jurisdiction.
Aside from the minimal social and cultural influences still applicable,
“exclusive control” is the concept consistent throughout most definitions of
sovereignty.209 This Note proposes a two-part test, in which a court would ask:
(1) whether the United States exercises control in the territory, and (2) whether
the United States exercises that control exclusively. The court should look at
each factor under a totality of the circumstances analysis, looking not only to
the plain language of any governing agreement (lease or otherwise), but also to
the realistic extent of U.S. power over the area.210 Under this test, the court
would not be forced to stray too far from the traditional analysis, therefore
continuing to protect U.S. boundaries. At bottom, the two parts of the
proposed test make up the real substance of sovereignty. The court would
merely be replacing a rigid standard with a manageable test more attune to
today’s environment. Further, the test would provide for considerable judicial
interpretation, subsequently giving the court flexibility211 to deal with future
cases.
In the case of most U.S. bases abroad, the United States asserts sufficient
control to satisfy part I of the test. The United States is given almost total
control in these areas by the agreements themselves, consequently asserting
most or all relevant powers of sovereignty.212 It is the second part of the test
209. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY OF LAW, 461 (1996) (freedom from external
control); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 128 (supreme dominion, authority, or rule);
CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 166 (“Sovereignty . . . is the right of a state in regard to certain
areas of the world to exercise jurisdiction over persons and things to the exclusion of the
jurisdiction of other states.”).
210. The Fourth Circuit, in Burna v. United States, stated in dicta that “it is not a conclusive
test that under the Treaty attributes of sovereignty can be exercised for the time being by the
United States . . . [t]hat the United States could at any time set aside Japanese laws does not, as
we see it, signify that Okinawa has lost its foreign character.” 240 F.2d 720, 722 (4th Cir. 1957).
The persuasive authority of this case is no doubt miniscule, as it has only been cited to one time
since the early 1980s. See Bird v. United States, 923 F. Supp. 338, 342 (D.Conn. 1996). In fact,
no court has ever cited Burna for the specific quotes mentioned above. But, the ideas serve as a
good example of what courts should be looking for - something more than a relaxed, intermittent
presence.
211. It can be argued that courts may not want this flexibility, especially considering the
premium placed by some on national security, and the cumbersome, ambiguous nature of the
problem. See supra note 77 and accompanying text; supra note 56, 155; infra note 214.
212. See, e.g., Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377, 383 n.4 (1948) (The United
States obtained “all the rights, power and authority . . . necessary for the establishment, use,
operation and defense thereof, or appropriate for their control” on the Bermuda base.); Heller v.
United States, 605 F. Supp. 144, 146 (E.D.Penn. 1985) (The United States acquired “the
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that will cause the most trouble for any military base detainee. Most bases
either apply, or at least recognize, the law of the host country.213 But therein
lies the beauty of the test. The court is forced to ascertain the appropriate
forum, directly pointing the individual to where the opportunity for a remedy
lies.214 Whether pass or fail, U.S. law or foreign, the detainee will know which
law applies, and where he/she should proceed. This test may not change many
outcomes, but the effect of a more appropriate, adaptable approach sufficiently
increases the assurance that each decision will be correct.
1.

Application to Guantanamo

As to Guantanamo, the circumstances are more complex, but the answer
should still be easy. The lease itself gives the United States “complete
jurisdiction and control.”215 As seen above, the United States asserts all
relevant powers over the area. In addition, these powers are exercised
exclusively by the United States, free from any Cuban influence.216
Guantanamo is not governed under U.S. law “for the time being.”217 The
United States’ indefinite presence in Guantanamo is unlike their presence at
any other facility. The United States acts freely, without regard for Cuban law
or rights. It is this strong, forceful, and declarative existence of the United
States that sets Guantanamo apart, and ultimately demands recognition.
CONCLUSION
Although presented with a peculiar and difficult set of facts, the Rasul
court did its best to maintain the status quo. Petitioners asserted a strong pair
of substantive and technical arguments, all of which were disposed of
systematically by the legal weapons of Eisentrager, its progeny, and the plain
language of the lease. Eisentrager sets forth a strict, immovable standard, and
the lease itself provided a definitive answer. No doubt, further petitioners will
assurance of unhampered . . . military operations” on Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines.);
United States v. Wilmot, 29 C.M.R. 514, 516 (C.M.A. 1960) (The United States has “police
power unfettered by Japan within the area” of Yokota Air Force Base.).
213. See, e.g., United States v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217, 221 (1949) (Newfoundland law applies);
Heller, 605 F. Supp. at 146 (Clark Air Force Base subject to Philippine law). But see, Wilmot, 29
C.M.R. at 516 (“[I]t is well established that Yokota Air Force Base . . . has been delivered over to
the United States for its ‘exclusive use’. . .).
214. Both the Eisentrager and Rasul Courts limited their opinions to U.S. federal courts,
while hinting that the detainees may have had a remedy elsewhere, namely the Geneva
Convention. Unfortunately, this option poses many problems of its own. See Jennifer Elsea,
Treatment of “Battlefield Detainees” in the War on Terrorism, Congressional Research Service,
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31367.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2003).
215. See Lease to the United States of Lands in Cuba for Coaling and Naval Stations, Feb. 1623, 1903, U.S.-Cuba, art. III, T.S. No. 418.
216. See supra notes 163-206 and accompanying text.
217. Burna v. United States, 240 F.2d 720, 722 (4th Cir. 1957).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

1274

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 47:1243

be wary of bringing these cases until Rasul has run its course through the
Supreme Court. But if the Supreme Court does alter or modify its position on
Guantanamo, the decision could have far-reaching effects on the international
jurisdiction of the United States.
First, this case could change the way the United States handles
international enemies, both in how they are detained and how they are tried.
The dissolution of the legal gray area that these detainees now face could bring
both positive and negative results. True, the logistical dangers of transporting
and trying these individuals expressed by Eisentrager and other courts could
have a dampening effect on U.S. military operations abroad. But, this case can
also be seen as an improvement on U.S. treatment of aliens, enemy or
friendly—an effect that would not go unnoticed internationally.
Second, this case could enhance the rights of civilians to bring civil suits
against the government for acts occurring on military bases or at embassies.
Right now, the United States retains sovereign immunity against claims arising
in “foreign countries” pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act.218 In fact, most
of the cases relied on by the Rasul court dealt specifically with this Act. If the
rigid lines of what constitutes a foreign country are relaxed, and the weight
afforded sovereignty is decreased, subsequent courts dealing with the Act may
lower the walls around federal jurisdiction. This too may have both positive
and negative effects. Although, as is the case domestically, there could be an
influx of frivolous suits, the expansion of rights for U.S. citizens abroad and
the possibility of truly aggrieved parties obtaining compensation for injuries
would be undoubtedly positive.
Ultimately, justice requires a change in this area of law. Eisentrager is an
outdated rule established against a completely different international backdrop
which relies too heavily on an intangible word or idea. Times have changed
and have ushered in fresh and diverse views on how our country handles itself
abroad. Our society has closely held its political opinions, its cultural views,
and most of all, its power. Now, people are no longer bent on world
domination, but are more concerned with world equality and the betterment of
mankind. The United States can no longer adhere to international laws that
blindly contradict the facts.
That being said, this is neither a popular case nor a popular argument with
the American public. Assuming these detainees are guilty of terrorism, they
struck directly at the heart of the United States. The greatest and proudest
pillars of American life were attacked, and regardless of any individual
thoughts on the need for consistent fairness for all, the masses are out for
blood. Hence, the short-sided view of any court deciding to hear the detainees’
petition will inevitably be that of disapproval. But, the greatest and proudest
pillars of American culture, pride, and history (in essence the reason why
218. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (2000); supra notes 80, 83.
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Americans love being American) must shine onward. The beauty of the
United States, and its justice system, is that the focus is not on the individual,
or the specific act, but on the pursuit of justice, equality, and the general
welfare. As these staple qualities are not forgotten, the belief that U.S. courts
strive for greatness, rather than vengeance will unwaveringly remain.
SETH J. HAWKINS*
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